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OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES:
OUTCOMES, INTENTIONS OR INTERDEPENDENCE?
YORAM HALEVY AND MICHAEL PETERS
Abstract. If preferences and beliefs are appropriately parametrized,
dierent theories of \other-regarding" preferences poses equilibria
that are consistent with experimental results in a variety of setting.
Our goal is to experimentally separate between those theories, by
studying their comparative-static performance in the neighborhood
of the classic Ultimatum Game, whose results are extremely robust.
In order to perform this exercise, we rst characterize all Perfect
Bayesian Equilibia in the Ultimatum Game if preferences are inter-
dependent. We then show that in this model, capping the demand
a proposer can make may increase the proposer's demand and the
responder's acceptance probability. Outcome-based theories and
intentions-based models have opposite predictions. We then de-
sign and execute an experiment that facilitates almost instanta-
neous learning and convergence by both proposers and responders.
The experimental results are consistent with the predictions of the
interdependent-preferences model. Beyond the evident theoretical
implications, the economic and social implications of this result are
far-reaching: low minimum wage may lower wages, and high price
cap may increase the price a monopolist charges.
1. Introduction
The past twenty years have seen a surge in theories that depart from
the benchmark of selsh preferences, motivated mainly by experimental
evidence and introspection. Since the work of Levine [36] it has been
shown that dierent theories may have a parametrization that results
in equilibria among which there exists an equilibrium that is consis-
tent with the experimental ndings. The goal of the current study is
to design and execute a simple experimental test that can dierenti-
ate among those theories. The Ultimatum Game (G uth et al [27]) is
used as a benchmark, since it is a well studied game, with very robust
outcomes. The ultimatum game has motivated many of the theories
of \other-regarding" preferences, and all of them can account for its
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1stylized properties. The experiment we conduct is a small perturba-
tion of the original game: we study how oers made by proposers and
responders' acceptance rate change when oers must be higher than
some exogenously determined minimum.
The Ultimatum Game describes a simple and natural interactive de-
cision problem that is inherent to almost every bargaining environment:
a proposer makes a demand of p (between 0 and  p) to a responder. If
the responder accepts, the proposer receives his demand and the re-
sponder receives  p   p: If the responder rejects then both receive zero.
A well known backwards induction argument predicts that a selsh re-
sponder should accept any positive oer and therefore a selsh proposer
should make a maximal demand. As is now well known, the experimen-
tal evidence refute this prediction. Furthermore, several experimental
regularities have emerged: as the demand increases the probability of
acceptance decreases; the relation between the proposer's oer and his
expected revenue is hump shaped; and there is a substantial variation
in demands that are made in experiments: proposers do sometimes de-
mand everything (make low oers) even though these oers are often
rejected.
Models of other-regarding preferences that account for the experi-
mental regularities in the ultimatum game and its variants (the dictator
game, trust game, gift exchange game) can be broadly classied into
three classes: outcome-based models (Fehr and Schmidt [21], Bolton
and Ockenfels [11]) assume that a player's utility may be a function of
the resources allocated to other agents as well as to herself. These mod-
els incorporate heterogeneity across agents. Interdependent preferences
models (Levine [36]) allow the agent's preferences to depend not only
on her opponent's resources but also on her type. Since players are het-
erogeneous, the opponent's action aects both the material allocation
and the inference the agent makes about the opponent type.1 Intention-
based (reciprocity) models (Rabin [40]) assume the agent cares about
her opponent's intentions (beliefs) and motives. The latter models use
the \psychological games" (Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [25])
framework.2 There exists some experimental evidence that points to
1Gul and Pesendorfer [26] provide a non-strategic foundation for reduce-form
behavioral interdependence.
2Many hybrid models that combine elements from the above models have been
proposed. Cox et al [15] proposed a nonparametric model of preferences dened
over own and other's payos. In their model, a decision maker will become \more
altruistic" if the budget set he is oered to choose from is \more generous". The
model has the very nice feature that it naturally extends standard consumer theory
to analyze important issues that arise in a variety of experiments. However, it is
2the importance of intentions (e.g. Camerer [13] pages 110-113; Blount
[10]; Falk et al [17, 18] and McCabe, Rigdon and Smith [39]). How-
ever, this evidence only excludes outcome-based models, which have
their own appeal in their simplicity. The experimental methodology
we employ tests the equilibrium response of the dierent theories in
close proximity to the most standard (and robust) experiment in this
eld, by investigating the eect of setting a lower bound to the of-
fer a proposer can make.3 The equilibrium response of outcome and
intention-based models to our proposed comparative static is straight-
forward. In outcome-based models, proposers that otherwise would
oer below the minimum should make the minimal oer, while the rest
of the oer distribution and the conditional acceptance rates do not
change. In intention-based models, the perceived kindness of each oer
diminishes. As a result, the conditional acceptance rates decrease and
oers should (weakly) increase.
In order to evaluate the implications of the comparative static when
preference are interdependent, it is essential to rst characterize the
equilibrium of the ultimatum game. Following the approach of Levine
[36], the game is modeled as a signaling game in which preferences are
`interdependent' in the sense that players' preferences depend on other
players' types. Levine [36] assumed that proposers and responders are
sampled from an identical distribution and have symmetric utility func-
tion. Although Levine was able to calibrate his model, we are not aware
of a tight characterization of all equilibria in this framework.4 We nd
that the rich variety of behavior observed in the ultimatum game can be
accounted for by a simple structure of interdependence, which we term
negative interdependence. This means that the more eager the pro-
poser is to have his demand accepted, the less interested the responder
is to accept that demand.5 Traditional explanations of behavior in the
ultimatum game can be recast in terms of interdependence. For exam-
ple, the type of the proposer could represent his greed. A responder
not suitable to analyze environments like the ultimatum game where the choice set
available to the responder is not convex (although one can consider generalizations
of the game, as in Andreoni et al [1] which t into Cox et al's framework). Other
explanations are based on evolutionary arguments and deemphasize backwards in-
duction reasoning (Binmore et al [24, 8, 7, 9]).
3An alternative approach would be to suggest a completely new environment,
and to study whether the dierent models can account for equilibrium behavior in
that experiment.
4Appendix A includes a characterization of equilibrium in an environment similar
to Levine's.
5Negative interdependence corresponds to Gruocho Marx's philosophy of not
belonging to a club who would accept him as a member.
3will receive some utility from rejecting an oer from a greedy proposer
rather than being concerned per se with the payo dierence. Similarly,
the view that subjects employ in simple experimental settings rules of
thumb that have developed in more complex but more common en-
vironments (as in Aumann [3] and Frank's [23] \rule rationality") can
be formalized using the framework of interdependence. For example,
responders and proposers may employ in a one-shot ultimatum game
rules that were developed in an oer-counteroer game that they usu-
ally play. A rejection of an unfair oer is the response that would work
best in everyday bargaining situations in which the rejection would be
followed up with a counteroer. How eective it would be to reject
such an oer depends on characteristics of the proposer that the re-
sponder can't know - his discount rate for example. The proposer's
initial oer signals information about his unknown type. It should be
emphasized that the current paper does not take a stand on the inter-
pretation of negative interdependence, but allows a unied treatment
of various motivations that have been suggested in the past.
Negative interdependence represents a very simple type of prefer-
ence interdependence. The responder's preferences depend on the pro-
poser's preference, but not on any higher order consideration since the
proposer's preferences don't depend on the responder's preferences at
all. Despite the fact that this simple formulation supports the rich set
of behavior that has already been observed in ultimatum experiments,
it is restrictive enough to provide testable implications. That is, we
can provide a comparative static result that diers from the results
associated with outcome-based or intention-based models, giving the
objective reader an opportunity to compare the performance of our
model with some well-known alternatives.
When there is negative interdependence, all perfect Bayesian equi-
libria of the ultimatum game involve pooling of proposer types who
are least eager to have their demands accepted, at the highest possible
demand. Dierent equilibria are characterized only by the degree of
separation of the other types. This separation generates the disper-
sion of demands that is so commonly observed in experimental results.
However, there is a strict bound on this dispersion - demands will never
be `too' low (we describe the exact lower bound in what follows). Since
the proposers who are eager to have their oers accepted make low de-
mands, high demands must be accepted with lower probability to sup-
port incentive compatibility. This supports the declining acceptance
probability that is so common in experiments.
However, this declining acceptance probability also presents a puzzle
since the expected return (the demand the proposer makes times the
4probability it is accepted) is not constant as one might expect. Instead,
it has a distinct hump shape, making it something of a mystery why
proposers make very low and high demands. In our model, proposers
dier about the relative value of acceptance and rejection of a demand.
Those proposers who are more eager to have their demands accepted,
act as if they are punished more heavily by a rejection than the less
anxious proposers. As a consequence, the former are willing to accept
a lower expected return (and a very high acceptance probability) than
the latter.
After characterizing all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, we perform the
comparative static investigation described above: we study how the
equilibrium (distribution of oers and conditional acceptance rates)
changes if we set an upper bound to the demand made by a proposer.
As explained above, outcome and intention-based models predict con-
centration of oers on the lower bound, and decrease or no change (re-
spectively) in the acceptance rate. We show that the equilibrium with
negative interdependence predicts higher demands (lower oers) and
higher acceptance rate. The intuition behind this prediction is that if
the subset of low types who make high demands will not increase, then
responders (who have low marginal utility of rejecting oers made by
low types) would accept these high demand in certainty. To maintain
an equilibrium, the subset of proposers who make high demands must
increase, and in order to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
of the new pivotal high type proposer - the acceptance probability must
increase. We nd that the experimental results are consistent with the
negative interdependence model proposed here.
One could argue that the experimental results are a consequence of
anchoring: once an external bound is set, all agents (proposers and
responders) adjust their expectations to that bound. Therefore, if the
bound is low - lower oers will be made and they will be accepted
more frequently than in the base treatment. This line of reasoning
assumes that a lower bound of 0 (as in the standard game) has no
such anchoring eect. To test whether the results are a consequence of
equilibrium behavior or simply anchoring, we manipulate the presenta-
tion of the problem to subjects in the following way: the proposer can
make an oer as in the standard ultimatum game, but the payment
to the responder, if she accepts, equals the oer plus a certain amount
(that is equal to the lower bound set before). This treatment is strate-
gically equivalent to the truncation used above, but does not involve
anchoring. We nd that the eects on the oer distribution and the
conditional acceptance rate are robust and signicant, though smaller
than in the original treatment we considered.
5The economic implications of modeling interdependent preference in
a bargaining environment and the comparative statics performed may
be very important: consider, for example, wage bargaining. Almost ev-
ery bargaining model has an ultimatum component, to which we could
apply the comparative static result. Our theoretical and experimental
results suggest that as a result of setting a minimum wage, the wage
distribution may shift to the left. Similarly, prices are determined in a
bargaining process which induces price dispersion. Setting a maximum
price may shift the price distribution to the right.6 Evidently, these en-
vironments are much more complex than the stylized ultimatum game
studied here, but the latter is an important ingredient in the price (in-
cluding wage) setting process. The current study suggests to apply
caution when analyzing such environments, and to further investigate
the implications of such policies on prices.
2. The Model
Let P be a nite collection of feasible demands (oers) for the pro-
poser. These are normalized to lie between 0 and 1. Suppose these
oers are indexed in such a way that 0 = p1 < p2 < ::: < pn = 1. The
lowest demand p1 is assumed to give all the surplus in the experiment
to the responder. The highest demand pn is assumed to give all the
surplus from the experiment to the proposer. The proposer is of type
s 2 [s;s]  S, which aects the payo of both players.7 The distri-
bution of types is given by F; and is assumed to be continuous with
full support. Let  2 f0;1g denote the action of the responder,  = 1
meaning that she accepts the proposal. The payos are treated asym-
metrically. The payo to the proposer is given by up(p;;s) where s is
his type.
6Some empirical evidence to that eect may be found in Knittel and Stango
[34] who study the credit market market. Their interpretation is that price ceiling
serve as a focal point. Our third treatment shows that the eect may persist even
when focal point is not established. Experimental studies by Isaac and Plott [32]
and Smith and Williams [49] do not support the hypothesis that price controls
away from the competitive equilibrium serve as focal points in a double auction
environment, but nd that controls close to the equilibrium may aect convergence.
Other experimental papers are discussed below in 10.
7The case of negative interdependence does not require heterogeneity on the re-
sponder side, though it could be added without aecting the main conclusions of the
analysis that follows. The case of positive interdependence, studied in Appendix A,
required heterogeneity on both sides in order to accommodate the standard exper-
imental results. The Appendix also demonstrates the technical changes required to
introduce two-sided heterogeneity.
6Assumption 1. For all s 2 S:
(1) up(p0;1;s) > up(p;1;s) for all p0 > p.
(2) up(p0;0;s) = up(p;0;s) for all p;p0 2 P.
The rst part of the assumption states that if his demand is accepted,
the proposer is better o with higher demand (lower oer). The second
part assumes that he is indierent among all rejected demands. We
maintain the monotonicity assumption incorporated in the rst part,
to minimize the departure from a benchmark of selsh preferences,
and to highlight the importance of interdependence in the comparative
statics to follow. One natural way to generalize the model is to relax
it.
The following assumption is also used repeatedly.
Assumption 2. Let s0 and s be such that
up(p;0;s)   up(p;1;s) < up(p;0;s
0)   up(p;1;s
0)
and suppose that for some pj > pk and qj < qk,
qjup(pj;1;s) + (1   qj)up(pj;0;s)  qkup(pk;1;s) + (1   qk)up(pk;0;s)
Then the same inequality holds strictly for type s0.
This\single-crossing"assumption states that if proposer of type s utility
loss as a result of being rejected is lower than the utility loss of type s0,
and if type s expected utility from a high demand (pj) with probability
of acceptance (qj) is not lower than his expected utility of a lower
demand (pk < pj) with higher probability of acceptance qk > qj), then
proposer of type s0 strictly prefers the higher demand.
The payo to the responder also depends on the proposer's type.
This payo function is given by ur(p;;s): We assume that:
Assumption 3. The function ur(p;0;s)   ur(p;1;s) is monotonically
increasing and supermodular in p and s. For every s there is a p > 0
such that ur(p;0;s)   ur(p;1;s) < 0; ur(p;0;s)   ur(p;1;s) > 0 for
some p, and ur(p;0;s)   ur(p;1;s) < 0 for all p 2 P.
The assumption is made on the responder's marginal utility of rejection,
if she knew the proposer's type s: It is assumed that the marginal utility
of rejection is increasing and supermodular in the proposer's demand
and type. That is, if the responder would know the proposer's type, for
higher proposer's type the change in the marginal utility of rejecting a
higher demand is higher. No matter what are the responder's beliefs
about the proposer's type, there is some demand the responder would
accept. A responder who believes the proposer's type is s will reject
7some oer, while a responder who believes the proposer's type is s will
accept any oer.
This game has many equilibrium outcomes. The nature of these
outcomes depends on the function up(p;0;s) up(p;1;s). In Appendix
A we analyze the case where this function is strictly increasing. Since
this function is always increasing for the responder, we refer to this as a
situation of positive interdependence. Since in the case were there is no
responder heterogeneity the equilibrium can contain no more than two
distinct demands, we characterize in the Appendix a similar model with
responder heterogeneity. We show that for every sequence of demands,
there exist distributions of subjects that will support that sequence as
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Since this model cannot be refuted, we
turn below to analyze an alternative structure of interdependence.
2.1. Equilibrium with Negative Interdependence. We now con-
sider the case where up(p;0;s) up(p;1;s) is monotonically decreasing
in s. We refer to this as negative interdependence. Without committing
to a specic interpretation, the higher the proposer's type, the greater
is the utility loss due to a responder's rejection. The responder's mar-
ginal utility of rejection continues to increase in the proposer's type.
As discussed in the Introduction, this formulation unies the fairness
and \rule-rationality" interpretations. Roughly speaking, the proposer
now has an incentive to try to hide his information from the responder
because their interests are not aligned.
The following assumption is required to construct an equilibrium:
Assumption 4. For any demand p let s be such that ur(p0;1;s) <
ur(p0;0;s) for each p0 > p. Then
up(p;1;s) > up(p;0;s)
That is, if for every p0 > p; a responder who knows the proposer's
type prefers to reject p0, then the proposer prefers p to be accepted. In
other words: let ^ s be the solution to ur(p;0;s) = ur(p;1;s). This is the
proposer's type such that if the responder believed the proposer had
that type for sure, she would be just indierent between accepting and
rejecting the demand p. Roughly the Assumption above states that
provided a type s isn't too much lower than ^ s, the proposer of type s
would strictly prefer to have the demand p accepted.
Under these assumptions, all perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria exhibit
the property that higher demands are accepted with lower probability.
Theorem 5. Let p0 > p be two demands made on the equilibrium path.
The probability with which the demand p is accepted is at least as large
as the probability with which p0 is accepted.
8We now identify all the equilibrium outcomes for the game with neg-
ative interdependence. We rst prove that a sequence of demands can
be supported in a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium only if the high-
est demand is the whole pie, and the demands partition the proposer's
types in a way that if the responder knows that a certain oer is made
by an interval of proposer's types - she is just indierent between ac-
cepting and rejecting the oer (except possibly the lowest demand).
Theorem 6. Suppose negative interdependence, that Assumptions 1,
2, 3, 4 hold and that that up(1;0;s) > up(1;1;s). Then an ascend-
ing sequence of demands (1;:::;K) can be supported as a Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium demands if
(1) K = 1; and
(2) there exists a strictly descending sequence of K+1 types (s1;:::;sK;sK+1)
with s1 = s and sK+1 = s satisfying
Z sk
sk+1
fur (k;0;s)   ur (k;1;s)gdF(s)  0
with equality holding for all k except possibly for k = 1.
We verify below that the theorem isn't vacuous in the sense that
interesting equilibria of this kind always exist. We next show that all
equilibria must look like this.
Theorem 7. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 6, the ascending se-
quence of demands f1;:::;Kg can be supported as equilibrium oers
in some Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which every demand is
accepted with positive probability only if Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem
6 hold.
The proofs of Theorems 6 and 7 are contained in Appendix B.8 The
equilibrium with negative interdependence has a very simple characteri-
zation: From (1), some proposer types must demand 1 and this must be
weakly acceptable given responders beliefs when they see this demand.
So there must be an interval of types [s;sm] who demand 1. Let p be
the lowest demand that a responder, who believes that the proposer
type is sm, prefers to reject. No demand between p and 1 will be made
with positive probability. At the other extreme, from Assumption 3,








. This demand is
acceptable to the responder independently of her beliefs. No demand
below this can be sustained in any Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
In every PBNE the demands are a weakly decreasing functions of the
8Subsection 3.1 contains demonstration of the equilibrium for K = 3.
9proposer's type. That is, the less eager the proposer is that his demand
will be accepted, the higher will be his demand.
Appendix C describes the most informative equilibrium - the Maxi-
mally Dispersed Equilibrium, in which beyond the partial pooling at the
highest demand (made by the lowest type proposers), the equilibrium
virtually separates all proposers in (sm;  s].
One property of particular interest is the expected payo to pro-
posers associated with dierent oers. In a collection of experimental
results, for example, one might check empirically how often an oer
pk is accepted, then compute the product of pk and the observed ac-
ceptance probability in order to compute an expected payo. Many
experimental studies have shown that the expected revenue to the pro-
poser is hump shaped (e.g. Roth et al [43], Slonim and Roth[47]).9 The
following Theorem states sucient conditions for the expected revenue
to the proposer to be hump-shaped in the case that the proposer's pay-
o if his demand is accepted is linear in demand (proof in Appendix
B.)
Theorem 8. Suppose that up (p;1;s) = p(s) for some strictly posi-
tive function  and that there is some proposer type s < s such that
up (0;0;s) < 0. Then the function qkpk is decreasing when up (p;0;s)
is positive and increasing otherwise.
3. A Comparative Static Experiment: Capping the Demand
We now turn to an experimental investigation of the proposed equi-
librium with negative interdependence. As demonstrated in the pre-
vious section, a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the ultimatum
game with negative interdependence can account for the known ex-
perimental regularities of the game. We were able to characterize the
equilibrium based on basic assumptions of the underlying preferences,
without assuming specic utility function. In this section we provide
a testable implication that can dierentiate it from other models of
other-regarding preferences, and in particular models of intention-based
reciprocity.
3.1. Theoretical Predictions. Consider the following slight varia-
tion of the ultimatum game: instead of allowing the proposer to de-
mand anything between 0 and  p, only demands between 0 and k p are
allowed (k < 1). That is, an upper bound on the demand is a propor-
tion k of the surplus. It is well known from the existing experimental
9Note that the fact that the probability of acceptance is decreasing in demand
is not sucient for the revenue to have a unique maximum.
10literature that for high enough k (e.g. 90%), only very few demands
are made in the excluded interval. 10
The eect of truncating the range of oers within the models of social
preference (outcome based) is straightforward: proposers who would
otherwise demand more than k p would demand k p, and the acceptance
probability should not change.
Any model of intention-based reciprocity would predict that the con-
ditional acceptance probability would (weakly) fall, and equilibrium
demands would (weakly) fall. The intuition is simple: any demand (es-
pecially close to k p) re
ects lower kindness of the proposer, since the
set of alternative low demands is smaller. Therefore the responder will
reciprocate to a given demand with a lower probability of acceptance.
The eect of setting an upper bound on the proposer's demand (a
lower bound on his oer) in any Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
with negative interdependent preferences is more subtle. We demon-
strate the arguments in Figure 3.1 using K = 3. The top part corre-
sponds to the standard PBNE: start with 3 = 1 and choose s3 such
that a responder who receives a demand of 1 will believe that it came
from a proposer whose type is in the interval [s;s3) and will be indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting the oer. The responder will
choose q3 (the probability of accepting a demand of 1) such that a pro-
poser of type s3 will be indierent between demanding 1 and 2 < 1.
This latter demand is made by proposers whose type is in [s3;s2), so
the responder is indierent between accepting and rejecting 2. Now
q2, the probability of accepting 2, is determined by making a proposer
of type s2 indierent between demanding 2 and 1 < 2. Finally, 1 is
made by proposer whose type is in [s2;s], and a responder who observes
this demand would weakly prefer to accept.
When the proposer's demand is capped at 2, a proposer of type
lower than s3 can demand at most 2. Remembering that the respon-
der's marginal utility of rejecting is increasing in the proposer's type, if
a responder who receives such a demand had believed that it came only
10This situation is quite dierent from Falk, Fehr and Zehnder [19] who study
the eects of setting a upper bound on demand (using a minimum wage) that is
lower than most demands made in its absence. Furthermore, their experiment is
much more involved than the simple comparative static exercise performed here
(simultaneous uniform wage oers to up to three potential employees). In another
work, Falk and Kosfeld [20] study the eect of allowing the receiver in a Dictator
game to set a lower limit on the dictator's transfer. This is a considerably dierent
problem than the game studied in this paper, although interdependent preferences
could be applied there as well: in her decision whether to constrain the dictator,
the receiver is able to signal her type, that aects the dictator's payo.
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Figure 3.1. Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and
Capped Demand
from proposers in [s;s2), she would strictly prefer to accept 2. There-
fore, to make the responder indierent between accepting and rejecting
2, the set of proposers who demand 2 must be [s;s0) where s0 > s2.
That is, the subset of proposers [s2;s0), who demanded 1 before set-
ting the cap, would demand now 2>1. Moreover, the probability of
accepting 2 is now determined by the new pivotal proposer type s0.
From the construction of the original PBNE, s0 strictly preferred to
demand 1 to demand 2, when the probability of acceptance of 2 is
12q2. In order to make q0 indierent between the two demands, the prob-
ability of accepting 2 must increase to q0 > q2. The same argument
can be made when the grid of demands is ner, and the eect continues
beyond the upper bound itself. Similarly, if the cap is set between 2
and 1, if only proposers in the interval [s;s3] had demanded the upper
demand, then a responder would strictly prefer to accept it (since the
responder's marginal utility of rejection is increasing in p). Hence the
set of proposers who demand the lower bound must increase, and the
argument continues as above.
To summarize, the predictions for any PBNE with negative interde-
pendent preferences, is that when a maximal demand (minimal oer) is
set then: higher demands (lower oers) will be made, and the probabil-
ity of acceptance of these demands will increase relative to the base.11
These predictions are in opposite directions to the predictions derived
from models of social preferences and intention-based reciprocity, and
serve as a simple experimental method to dierentiate between these
theories.
3.2. Experimental Design and Implementation. Subjects were
undergraduate students at the University of British Columbia who were
recruited by an e-mail message sent from the Student Service Centre to
a random group of students. After signing a consent form, the subjects
received a detailed explanation about the experiment. After the sub-
jects read the instructions, they were asked to answer some questions
to verify that they understood how the payment will be implemented.
Those subjects who didn't fully understand the implementation (see
below), received a detailed explanation from a research assistant. Only
after conrming that all subjects understood the procedures, the ex-
periment started.
In order to allocate the subjects to a\proposer"and\responder"role,
they all participated in an\I Spy"contest. The contest treatment was
implemented in earlier studies in order to legitimize the position of a
proposer (e.g. Homan et al [30], Bolton and Zwick [12], List and
Cherry [38]). Subjects who scored higher in the contest were desig-
nated a \proposer" and received $5. The rest were asked to move to a
11Notice that the comparative static is performed on a single equilibrium. We
don't have an equilibrium selection rationale that will suggest which equilibrium is
being played. However, the interdependence (both positive and negative) frame-
work is the only model that is consistent with increase in demand and conditional
acceptance rate as a response to capping the demand. Furthermore, since all PBE
share identical pooling on the highest possible demand, if the cap on demand is
high enough the eect on all equilibria will be similar.
13nearby room and were designated a \responder." The motivation be-
hind paying the proposers was to mitigate the property rights eect
created by the contest: we didn't want the contest treatment to in-
terfere in creating a baseline comparable to previous ultimatum game
experiments, but we felt that a random assignment (which is used in
many studies) may be problematic as well, as it creates substantial
ex-post asymmetries between ex-ante identical subjects.
The bargaining was over $55, that were to be paid on top of the
$5 (a total of $60). Although convergence to equilibrium strategies in
ultimatum game is not the main focus of the current study, we acknowl-
edge it is a non-trivial process. Previous studies (e.g. Roth et al [43],
Slonim and Roth [47], List and Cherry [38]) used a sequence of random
matching (without replacement) between proposers and responders. As
there is learning on both sides, it creates a complex learning problem
(Roth and Erev [42]). We decided to implement a new learning tech-
nology: each group (proposers and responders) was divided into two.
In the rst round, each proposer made oers12 to half of the responders
(those oers could have been dierent). Each responder received oers
from half of the proposers and chose whether to accept or reject each
oer. Then each proposer learned whether the oers he made were
accepted or not (he didn't know the oers made by other responders,
and the responses they received). In the second round, each proposer
made oers to the second half of the responders, and each responder re-
ceived oers from the proposers he had not interacted with before. This
method allows a proposer to experiment in the rst round oers, an in-
stantaneous learning among responders (who received various oers in
the rst round), and full learning by proposers in the second round. If
the conditional acceptance rate of responders does not change between
the rst and the second round, it would conrm the hypothesis that
they fully learned in the rst round. Therefore, we should not expect
additional experience to alter the responders or proposers strategies.
This conjecture is crucial for consistency with the common prior as-
sumption incorporated in the Bayesian equilibrium.13 This design also
12Note that throughout the experimental part of the work we use\oer", in order
to maintain consistency with the way the problem was presented to subjects.
13Harrison and McCabe [29] used one-to-one matching but allowed the proposers
to observe the distribution of the minimal acceptable oer of responders in the pre-
vious round. This strategic information is ner (and less costly) than the informa-
tion proposers receive in the current design. Bellemare, Kr oger and van Soest [6]
showed recently that utilizing subjective-stated probabilities of rejection allows an
econometrician to better t of the data than by using observed frequencies of rejec-
tion from the game played. The current design is able to overcome this challenge
14allowed to see whether proposers mixed among oers, and to see how
much of the mixing is strategic and how much is due to experimenta-
tion. The payment was determined by choosing at random one match
(out of the two rounds), and implementing the outcomes for each pair
in the match. In the baseline treatment the oers were allowed to vary
between $0 and $55, and in the limit treatment the oers were between
$5 and $55 (that is, demands were capped at $50).14
The design maintained anonymity between proposers and responders
(responders didn't know who made each oer, and proposers couldn't
know the identity of the responder who received a specic oer). Fur-
thermore, the recruiting strategy guaranteed that the probability that
a subject will know other subjects was extremely low. The design
kept the strategy and payo of the subjects hidden from the experi-
menters: experimenters in the rooms could not see the oers and accep-
tance/rejection decisions of subjects, and the payment was distributed
by a third group of experimenters (not present in the rooms where
the experiment took place) who placed the money in numbered sealed
envelops.
3.3. Results. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the baseline treat-
ment and the limit treatment. A total of 52 subjects took part in the
two sessions: 24 in the baseline (B) treatment and 28 in the limit (L)
treatment. Each proposer in the baseline treatment made 12 oers: 6
in each round, when the oers in round 2 (R2) were made after observ-
ing the acceptance/rejection of his oers in round 1 (R1). Similarly,
each proposer in the limit treatment made 14 demands - half in the
second round.
B-R1 B-R2 L-R1 L-R2
Average oer 19.07 21.21 15.31 15.00
Average acceptance rate 0.63 0.88 0.87 0.90
Within SD of demand 2.26 1.47 3.18 2.09
Total SD of demands 8.15 6.64 6.45 5.78
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Table 1 indicates the main nding of the investigation: setting a
lower bound on the oer (capping the demand) caused the oer to
by allowing proposers to estimate the (stable) probabilities of rejection in the rst
round.
14No show-up fee was paid since we felt it could distort the ultimatum structure
of the game: with a positive show-up fee a responder who rejects still leaves the













































































Base acceptance Limit acceptance Base2 offers Limit2 offers
Figure 3.2. The Eect of Setting a Lower Limit on
Oers and Acceptance Rate
fall by almost 30% from $21.21 to $15 (mean demand increased from
$33.79 to $40). In spite of the lower oers, the average acceptance rate
was marginally higher (90% in the limit treatment and 88% in the base
treatment), implying that the conditional acceptance rate increased
substantially. The learning and experimentation from the rst to the
second round could be seen by the decrease of about 35% of the within
proposer standard deviation: many proposers experimented in the rst
round by submitting dierent oers, but used a single oer in the second
round.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates graphically the eect of setting a lower limit:
the columns height represents the conditional acceptance rate for every
interval, and curve approximates the distribution of oers under the two
treatments.
Table 2 reports the distribution of oers and acceptance rate. Al-
though Table 2 reports the results for intervals, it is important to note
that about 90% of oers were made in multiples of $5. The table re-
veals the eect of setting a lower limit to the oers: the conditional
acceptance rate increases and the frequency of low oers increases.
16oer % Base-R1 Base-R2 Limit-R1 Limit-R2
$0 to $4 oers 0 0 0 0
acceptance
$5 to $9 oers 8 8 12 5
acceptance 33 17 50 60
$10 to $14 oers 25 0 31 34
acceptance 17 80 76
$15 to $19 oers 8 13 17 33
acceptance 50 78 94 100
$20 to $24 oers 18 39 28 20
acceptance 77 93 100 100
$25+ oers 39 40 12 8
acceptance 96 100 100 100
Table 2. Distribution of Oers and Acceptance Rate
by Treatment and Round
It is very important to note that although we introduced some new
and unconventional design methods in the experiment, the results in
the baseline treatment are comparable to existing experimental ndings
in the literature: oers below 25% of the pie (up to $14) are accepted
only 20% of the time, and 79% of oers are higher than $20 (which
is accepted most of the time). Furthermore, statistical tests that in-
vestigated the eect of the oer's rank on its acceptance probability,
showed that receiving several oers at once (and being able to compare
between them) had no signicant eect on the conditional acceptance
probability.
3.3.1. Acceptance Rate. As noted above, 90% of oers are made at
multiples of $5. This implies that using parametric assumptions, would
extends those observations to intervals were oers have rarely been
made. Instead, we compare (non-parametrically, using Fisher exact
test) the acceptance rate at oers of $5, $10, $15, $20 between the base
treatment and the limit treatment. We use both rounds since there
is no signicant dierence between the conditional acceptance rates at
dierent rounds, within the same treatment (for both the base and the
limit treatments). As noted above, this result indicates that the rst
round oers had sucient variation to allow responders to learn the
type distribution of proposers instantaneously. Since we simultaneously
test four hypotheses, care should be taken not to reject the joint null
hypothesis of \no limit treatment eect" when it is true. That is, the
p-values need to be adjusted such that the probability that at least
17one of the tests in the family would exceed the critical value under the
joint null hypothesis of no eect is less than 5%. We use the most
conservative approach - the Bonferroni adjustment (Savin [45, 46]), in
which each p-value is multiplied by the number of tests (four in our
case). It should be noted that we take a very conservative approach of
using the Fisher exact test and the Bonferroni adjustment, that treats
the acceptance rate at dierent oers as independent.
oer B accept B reject L accept L reject p-value
5 2 6 6 5 0.208263
10 3 15 49 14 0.000003
15 6 2 46 1 0.052297
20 35 5 39 0 0.029196
Table 3. Fisher Exact p-value (one-sided) for the eect
of Limit Treatment on conditional acceptance probability
As Table 3 clearly reveals, the null hypothesis that limiting the of-
fer (capping the demand) did not have an eect on the acceptance
probability is rejected at 1%. The strongest and most dramatic eect
occurred at $10: in the rst round, 25% and 31% of the oers in the
baseline and the limit treatments, respectively, were made at that level.
However, the acceptance rate in the base treatment was only 17% while
in the limit treatment the acceptance rate of those oers was 80%. The
experimental design allowed the proposers to learn this behavior, and
in the second round there were no oers of $10 in the base treatment,
while 34% of the oers in the limit treatment were made at $10.
It is of interest to note that the proposer's expected revenue in the
base treatment is maximized at an oer of $20 ($30.625) - which is the
mode of the oer distribution, while in the limit treatment the expected
revenue are maximized at an oer of $15 ($39.15), although the mode
of the oer distribution is at $10.
3.3.2. Oers. In order to test whether capping the demands has a sig-
nicant eect on oers we conduct a feasible GLS regression. We used
second-round oers since after the rst round, proposers learned the
conditional acceptance probability (as established above, the respon-
ders used the same acceptance probability in the two rounds). There-
fore, the second round is consistent with the common prior assumption
underlying the Bayesian signaling game. The negative eect of the
limit treatment on second-round oers is signicant at 1%.
As noted above, the standard deviation of oers decreased signif-
icantly between the rst and the second round in both treatments
18# of observation= 170 Obs per group
# of Groups= 26 min= 6
Estimated covariances= 26 max= 7
Panels: heteroskedastic; Wald 2 (1) = 228.19
no auto-correlation Prob > 2 = 0.0000
oer coef SE z P > jzj [95% CI]
Limit treatment -5.404759 0.35778 -15.11 0.000 -6.10601 -4.703506
Constant 20.42277 0.25102 81.36 0.000 19.9308 20.91476
Table 4. Second-Round Oers: Feasible GLS
(p<0.0001 in a random eect GLS controlling for treatment and round
without interaction). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that
proposers experimented in the rst round, and after estimating the ac-
ceptance probability made less dispersed oers in the second round.
15
3.4. Equilibrium or Anchoring? A skeptical reader may wonder
whether the results of the experiment had anything to do with interde-
pendent preferences, and may conjecture they are due to the\anchoring
and adjustment"bias identied in the behavioral decision theory liter-
ature (e.g. Slovic and Lichtenstein [48], Kahneman and Tversky [33],
Tversky and Kahneman [50]). According to this explanation, impos-
ing a minimum oer simply provides an anchor to the players, making
low oers seem more \fair", thereby increasing their incidence and the
respective acceptance probability. This conjecture is inconsistent with
the experimental instructions and procedures: if providing a minimum
of $5 in the limit treatment created an anchor, then the $0 in the base-
line treatment should have created an even lower anchor (the wording of
the instructions are almost identical in the two treatments). However,
the argument may go that the $0 does not provide an anchor. More-
over, the results are inconsistent with this conjecture as well: as clearly
shown in Table 2 and Table 3 most of the response to setting a minimum
oer of $5 occurred at higher oers ($10 and $15). Furthermore, Table
2 reveals that the dramatic eect of setting a low bound to oers was on
responders' acceptance rate (especially at $10) in the rst round. The
proportion of proposers who oered this amount in the rst round of
the two treatments diered only slightly (25% in the baseline and 31%
in the limit treatment), but the acceptance rate diered signicantly
(17% in the baseline and 80% in the limit treatment). As a result, pro-
posers in the baseline treatment, didn't make any oers in the interval
15In the base treatment 67% of the proposers made 6 identical oers in the second
round, and in the limit treatment 35% of proposers made 7 identical oers in the
second round. We didn't nd a treatment eect on the standard deviation of oers.
19B-R1 B-R2 I-R1 I-R2
Average oer 19.07 21.21 16.82 17.81
Average acceptance rate 0.63 0.88 0.75 0.82
Within SD of demand 2.26 1.47 1.19 1.03
Total SD of demands 8.15 6.64 7.96 6.45
Table 5. Summary Statistics: the Incentive vs. Base Treatments
of $10-$14 during the second round (the proportion of oers made in
this interval in the limit treatment increased only marginally to 34%
in the second round). The model of negative interdependence can ac-
count for this change in acceptance probability: in the limit treatment,
lower types (relative to the baseline treatment) made low oers, which
decreased the responders' marginal utility of rejecting them. There-
fore, the decrease in oers between the two treatment is due to lower
acceptance rate of low oers by responders (results consistent with
many other studies) and learning by proposers, both occurring in the
baseline treatment. One of the general lessons from the anchoring and
adjustment literature is that an initial high demand in a bargaining
interaction will increase the proposer's nal payo. The conclusions
from the experiment are the exact opposite: limiting the bargaining
power of the proposer increases his expected payo substantially.
However, in order to convince even the most skeptic reader (and
ourselves) of the importance of interdependent preferences and equilib-
rium reasoning, we conducted a third treatment, that was strategically
equivalent to the limit treatment, but did not provide an anchor. As
argued above the anchoring rationale can be applied only if a minimum
oer of $0 does not set an anchor. We therefore allowed the proposer to
make an oer between $0 and $50, and paid the responder an additional
$5 if she accepted an oer (an\incentive"). 36 subjects participated in
this treatment, that otherwise was identical to the base treatment. As
is evident from Table 5 average oer in the incentive treatments was
lower by $3.40 than in the base treatment, and the average acceptance
rate was about the same.
Table 6 compares the eect of the incentive design (that did not
provide an anchor) on the conditional acceptance probability. As in
the limit treatment, the conditional acceptance probability is higher in
the incentive treatment, and the eect is especially strong at oers of
$10 (less than 20% of the pie).
The eect on oers is signicant as well. A feasible GLS nds that an
incentive lowers oers by $2.5 relative to the base treatment (signicant
20oer B accept B reject I accept I reject p-value
5 2 6 4 10 0.63
10 3 15 41 24 0.000947
15 6 2 36 10 0.5754
20 35 5 71 3 0.099
Table 6. The Eect of the Incentive Treatment on Con-
ditional Acceptance Probability: Fisher Exact one sided
p-values
Figure 3.3. Eects of the Limit and Incentive treat-
ments on CDF of oers
at 0.01%). Figure 3.3 shows that there is almost a rst order stochas-
tic dominance between the oer distributions in the three treatments.
That is, for almost any oer, the probability of receiving an equal or
lower oer is highest in limit treatment, followed by the incentive treat-
ment and is lowest in the base treatment. Similar ranking is evident in
the conditional probability of acceptance.
Our conclusion from the three treatments is that the limit treatment
incorporates two eects: the equilibrium reasoning of interdependent
preferences which is the focus of the current paper (the incentive treat-
ment compared to the baseline treatment), and the anchoring eect -
which explains the lower oers and higher probability of acceptance in
the limit treatment compared to the incentive treatment.
213.5. Conclusion from the experiment. We conclude that the out-
come of the experiment is consistent with a Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium of the model with negative interdependence, while being
inconsistent with models of outcome and intention-based preference.
Although we are not aware that this type of argument has been
used before in the bargaining literature in Economics, it seems that
economic agents are well aware of this phenomenon. For example, an
incentive contract structure is quite common in labor agreements and
other contracts, and allows the proposer (employer, retailer, marketing
agent) to achieve higher expected revenue. In particular, posting of
a very low minimum wage (unlike [19] where the minimum wage is
set higher than 92% of the oers) may lead to a decrease in wages.
Similarly, government intervention in the form of maximum price where
price dispersion exists, may lead to an increase in average price of a
good.
An even more doubtful reader may question the robustness of our
results. We acknowledge that replication of every experimental result
is important in order to draw general conclusions. We tried our best
to design the experiment thoughtfully and carefully. The stakes were
signicant: subjects could have earned $60 in less than an hour, and
our results are highly signicant even with a modest sample size. But
even more important than the specic results in the specic experiment
we performed, is the modeling exercise we executed: we suggested a re-
vealed choice-based model of the ultimatum game, whose equilibria can
account for the known experimental ndings. We then suggested an
out-of-sample comparative static experiment on these equilibria, that
can dierentiate our model from existing models of other-regarding
preferences. Therefore, the study contributes new insights to the ongo-
ing research and debate of how to model other-regarding preferences,
and to the question whether game theory can provide the appropriate
tools to study those preferences. More generally, it provides an exam-
ple how economic theory can be silent of the psychological motives of
the economic actors, and yet provide testable predictions.
4. Concluding comments
The arguments above illustrate that it is possible to interpret the re-
sults of the ultimatum game experiments using standard game-theoretic
reasoning. We believe that it points to further complication that ex-
perimenters are well aware o, but theorist have not paid sucient
attention to: an experiment is actually a Bayesian game between three
22players - the proposer, the responder, and the experimenter. The ex-
perimenter is the one for whom the stakes in the game are actually
highest. The same sort of type dependencies ought to exist between
the experimenter and subjects. Of course, a single experiment con-
tains no variation in experimenter behavior that would make it possi-
ble to uncover this information, so the subjects' interpretation of the
experimental design and its in
uence on them presents a much more
complicated problem.
4.1. The Dictator Game. With this in mind, one may ask how the
proposers modeled in the current study would play the Dictator game
in which the proposer selects a demand then gets it for sure, and the
`responder' simply receives whatever the proposer oers. Since our
proposers are better o with higher demands conditional on them be-
ing accepted, they should presumably demand all the surplus from
the experiment for themselves.16 As noted above, the reason that this
doesn't happen is that the same type dependence exists between the
proposer and the experimenter - both the fact that the experimenter
suggests a Dictator game, and the other characteristics of the experi-
ment alter the proposer's perception of the payos in the experiment.
For example, Homan, McCabe and Smith [31] and Cherry, Frykblom
and Shogren [14] showed that implementing a subject-experimenter
anonymity and generating the surplus through eort, led almost all
dictators to make minimal transfers. These results stand in a sharp
contrast to standard dictator experiments (without contest/earned in-
come and experimented-dictator anonymity) where at least some of the
dictators give substantial amounts. Those \standard" dictator games,
stand also in contrast to the social-economic reality, were anonymous
charitable giving is quite rare (after all, how frequently do people share
the content of their bank accounts with complete strangers and with-
out anyone else knowing about that?) It is not a coincidence that
already in the twelve century, when Maimonides [41] enunciated eight
distinctive levels of charitable giving, anonymous giving occupied the
second-highest level of giving to the poor.17 We believe that the ap-
parent inconsistency between experimental outcomes (with random-
assignment and without subject-experimenter anonymity) and actual
charitable giving calls into doubt the main criticism of the monotonicity
16One may want to relax this assumption, but it is essential for the construction
of the PBE we study in the current paper
17The highest level of giving is someone who establishes a personal relationship
with the needy person, helping him with a loan or a partnership in a way that
doesn't make the latter a subordinate.
23assumptions in the interdependent preference model (both in Levine's
positive interdependent specication 18 and our model of negative inter-
dependence). This inconsistency led us to adopt the contest-anonymity
treatments in our experiment.19 Furthermore, Bardsley [4] and List [37]
showed that changing the dictator's strategy set to include negative
giving (taking) caused almost all dictators to behave selshly. Dana,
Weber and Kuang [16] showed that many dictators were willing to leave
the experimenter part of the surplus, instead of facing the choice of how
much to allocate to a passive responder - possibly showing preference
to share with the experimenter rather than with the other subject (see
also Lazear, Malmendier and Weber [35]). It may be impossible to
control all aspects, but using the theoretical methods described in this
study, it would presumably be possible to interpret the impact that the
experimental design has on outcomes. Recently, Andreoni and Bern-
heim [2] proposed a model of the dictator game that employs exactly
this type of reasoning to explain transfers in the dictator game. In their
framework, the dictator's payo depends on an audience (which may
include the receiver, the experimenter and possibly other parties) belief
about his type. They analyze the signaling equilibrium in the standard
game as well as in a game where the transfer may be determined by
an external mechanism, and show that in the standard game there is
pooling of dictators on the \fair" transfer, while when the probability
of forced external transfer increases, more proposer types pool on that
oer. Their model is an excellent example of the richness available in
the Bayesian model of interdependent preferences to study important
aspects of giving in experimental and real world setting.20
4.2. Beyond experiments. The interpretation of the ultimatum game
as a Bayesian game between agents with interdependent preferences has
applications beyond the experiments themselves. For example, it would
seem possible to incorporate negative interdependence into a standard
principal-agent incentive problem. Another possible application can be
18Rotemberg [44] adds the responder beliefs into the dictator's payo function
to rationalize positive dictator oers.
19It is important to note that our baseline results, as previous experiments that
implemented contest and anonymity (e.g. Homan et al [30], Bolton and Zwick
[12]), fall within the standard range of outcomes in ultimatum experiments. That
is, the strategic bargaining environment in the ultimatum game is robust to these
manipulations, while the charitable giving environment studied in the dictator game
is very sensitive to these treatments (see also Fershtman et al [22]).
20The audience eect may be responsible to lower giving reported recently by
Hamman et al [28] when dictators can delegate transfer decisions to agents who
represent their interests.
24in an auction design. In this case it is reasonable to expect that the
seller has some private information that is of interest to the buyers.
Conditional on this private information which is of common interest,
the buyers may have independent private valuations. The seller sets a
reservation price, that acts similarly to the demand in the ultimatum
game. If a buyer accepts this reservation price, she can bid in the auc-
tion. The structure of negative interdependence lends itself naturally
to this problem. The insights suggested by the analysis of the ultima-
tum game, and in particular the equilibrium played, can be applied to
this problem.
Even more importantly, the direct economic implications of mod-
eling interdependent preference in a bargaining environment and the
comparative statics performed in the current study have immediate
implications for understanding price (including wage) negotiations and
consequences of policy. As argued above, setting minimum wage in an
environment where wage dispersion exists, may shift the wage distri-
bution to the left. Similarly, setting a maximum price for a commodity
whose price is not unique may shift the price distribution to the right.
These examples suggest that policymakers should incorporate the fact
that agents are not selsh and have interdependent preferences when
considering alternative policy tools.
Appendix A. Equilibrium with Positive Interdependence
In this appendix, we analyze a model with positive interdependence.
Positive interdependence means that as the proposer's type increases,
both the proposer and the responder become less interested in hav-
ing any given demand accepted. One example might be when the
proposer's type is inversely related to his altruism. A less altruistic
(higher type) proposer gets less utility from the payo received by the
responder, and therefore cares less about whether a demand is accepted.
Responders are less inclined to accept demands by less altruistic pro-
posers, especially when they are themselves less altruistic.
It is not dicult to show that if we simply replace negative interdepen-
dence with positive interdependence in our model, no more than two
distinct demands can be supported in equilibrium. So we also use this
Appendix to illustrate how our approach is extended to one in which
responders have private types.
The simplest example of positive interdependence is perhaps the model
of Levine [36], who interprets the proposer's type as a measure of his
altruism. More altruistic proposers in Levine's model obtain higher
utility from the payo received by the responder. So for any given
25oer, the higher the proposer's type, the higher is the cardinal utility
of acceptance. Responder's payo in Levine's model increases the more
altruistic the responder thinks that the proposer is.21 The payo to
rejection is normalize to zero, so proposers' and responders' desire to
have an oer accepted move in the same direction as the proposer's
type changes, which corresponds to positive interdependence. For this
reason, this Appendix also claries the relationship between our paper
and Levine's.
For the rest of this appendix, we assume that the responder has a




. We will assume that the proposer's
payo, as in the main body of the paper, depends on his own type
s 2 [s;s]. To be consistent with the argument in the main body of the
paper, the proposer of type s is the most altruistic proposer, while the
proposer of type s is the least altruistic. The proposer's payo when
the proposal  is accepted is up (;1;s). In this appendix we normalize
the payo of a rejection to zero, as in [36].
The responder's payo depends on both his own type, and the pro-
poser's type, and is given by ur (;1;s;t). The responder of type t is the
most altruistic responder, the type t is the least altruistic responder.
As with the proposer, the payo to rejection is normalized to zero.
Levine's payo function for the responder is given by
ur (;1;s;t) = (1   ) +
~ t + ~ s
1 + 

where 0 <  < 1 and ~ t and ~ s measures the responder and the proposer
altruism respectively. This is equivalent to our payo function when
types are transformed as
~ s =  
2s   s   s
s   s
and
~ t =  
2t   t   t
t   t
:
In [36], the payo to the proposer is given by the same formula with
the share and types interchanged, i.e.,  + ~ s+~ t
1+ (1   ).
As mentioned above, we will impose the additional assumption that
the proposer's payo is independent of ~ t. We maintain the single cross-
ing Assumption 2 and add the following:
21It is interesting to compare to the rationale used by Cox et al [15]: in their
model higher (more generous) oers make the responder more altruistic. Hence
interdependence provides a structure through this assumption can be justied.
26Assumption 9. The function  ur(p;1;s;t) is monotonically increas-
ing and supermodular in s and p uniformly in t. For every s, there is
a p > 0 and a t such that ur(p;1;s;t) > 0; ur(p;1;s;t) < 0 for some p;
and ur(p;1;s;t) > 0 for all p 2 P.
An increase in the proposer's demand has a bigger impact on the
responder's payo the higher the responder thinks the proposer's type
is. The other parts of Assumption 9 simply require the type space
to be large enough to accommodate dierent behavior. For instance,
no matter what the responder thinks of the proposer, there is some
demand she will want to accept. Alternatively if a responder thinks
the proposer has the highest type, there is some demand she will want
to reject. Finally, the most altruistic responder dealing with the most
altruistic proposer will want to accept any demand. Levine's payo
function satises these.
As with negative interdependence, there are multiple equilibria. How-
ever, unlike negative interdependence, these equilibria can't be unam-
biguously interpreted with respect to the information conveyed by equi-
librium demands. So we focus on the kind of equilibrium Levine `cal-
ibrated'. In such an equilibrium, higher demands are made by less
altruistic proposers (or higher type proposers in our formalism). Even
under this assumption, there are many equilibrium outcomes. To hone
in a little more, we take Levine's approach, and assume that we al-
ready know the distribution of demands made in equilibrium, and the
probability with which each demand is accepted (possibly because we
have access to experimental data).





0 < ur (;1;s;t) for each type s of the proposer. Demands that don't
satisfy this property will never appear in equilibrium. By Assumption
9, all demands are accepted by some types of responders. If demands
are always accepted, they won't appear in equilibrium, since proposer's
payo is assumed to increase in demand.
We can now characterize a class of equilibria that resemble those in
[36]. A sequence of demands is supported as an altruistic equilibrium
if there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which each demand in the
sequence is made and accepted with strictly positive probability on the
equilibrium path, and no other demand is made with positive proba-
bility on the equilibrium path; and in which the equilibrium demand
is a weakly increasing function of the proposer's type. An altruistic
equilibrium is one in which higher demands are made by less altruistic
proposers.
27Let 1;:::;K be any increasing nite sequence of demands from
. Suppose that the proportion Qk of all demands are equal to k.
Then we'll construct an equilibrium in which proposers whose types
lie below sk make a demand that is no larger than k where sk is
chosen to satisfy F (sk) =
Pk
i=1 Qi. If the demand k is accepted with
probability qk, then qk must be the proportion of types who nd the
demand acceptable.
Theorem 10. Let  = f1;:::;Kg be such that each k 2 . There
exist distributions F and G of proposer and responder types respectively
such that the sequence is supported as an altruistic equilibrium if and
only if the system
(A.1) qkup (k;1;sk) = qk+1up (k+1;1;sk)
has an increasing solution for each k = 1;:::;K.
Proof. We deal with two directions.
If part of the theorem: Let fs1;:::;sKg be a solution to (A.1). Since
the proportion of all demands equal to k is given by Qk, we have some
distribution F of proposer types such that F (sk) =
Pk
n=0 Qn. Since K
is nite, we can assume F is continuous. From Lemma 11 below, each
array of types fs1;:::;sKg can then be associated with a set of types
ft1;:::;tkg that satisfy (A.2). This means that given the distribution
F, responder type tk is just indierent between accepting and rejecting
the demand k. Since the payo to acceptance is decreasing in respon-
der type, it is a best reply for responder types t0 > tk to reject k and
for types t0 < tk to accept it. If the system (A.1) has a solution, then
qk+1 < qk, and so there is some continuous distribution G such that
G(tk) = qk for each k.
It remains to show that proposers whose types are in the interval
[sk 1;sk] should demand k. It follows immediately from the single
crossing assumption 2, that types in this interval prefer k to any other
demand that occurs on the equilibrium path. So let k <  < k+1.
Since  2 , there is some type s such that ur (;1;s;tk+1) = 0.
Suppose that responders believe that a proposer who deviates to  has
exactly this type. Then the probability with which the proposal will be
accepted is the same as the probability with which the proposal k+1 is
accepted. Then all proposer types prefer the demand k+1 to k, and
according to the previous argument, they must prefer their equilibrium
demands.
Only if part of the theorem: Let sk be the highest type who makes
the demand k in equilibrium. Since proposer's demands are weakly
28increasing in type, and each demand occurs with strictly positive prob-
ability, the types sk are strictly ordered, and sK = s. If equality fails
at any sk then by continuity, some types will want to change their
demands. 
Lemma 11. For any continuous distribution F of proposer types, any
increasing sequence fkgk=1;:::K of demands from , and any increas-
ing sequence fs1;:::;sKg of proposer types with sk = s, there is a
decreasing sequence ft1;:::;tKg such that
(A.2) Es2[sk 1;sk]ur (k;1;s;tk) = 0
for each k, where s0 = s.
Proof. Begin with 1. Since 1 2 
Es2[s;s1]ur (1;1;s;s) < 0 < Es2[s;s1]ur (1;1;s;s)
as the assumption holds uniformly in s. By the mean value theorem,
there is a t1 such that
Es2[s;s1]ur (1;1;s;t1) = 0:
Now replace 1 with 2, and the interval [s;s1] with [s1;s2]. Since both
these changes reduce the acceptance payo to the responder of type t1,
we have
Es2[s1;s2]ur (2;1;s;t1) < 0 < Es2[s1;s2]ur (2;1;s;t1);
since 2 2 . The mean value theorem then gives t2 such that
Es2[s1;s2]ur (2;1;s;t2) = 0:
Repeat this procedure for the other demands. 
Whether the system (A.1) has a solution or not depends jointly on
the demands k, the acceptance probabilities Qk, and the payo func-
tion up. For example, with Levine's formulation of the payo function
qkup (k;1;s) = qk

k  




which is linear in proposer type. This function is 
atter the lower is k
(at least as long as qk is lower the higher is k). Apparently (A.1) can
have a solution in this case only if the sequence qkk is decreasing.
29Appendix B. Proofs of Theorems in Section 2.1
Proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem. Let p0 > p be two demands made on the equilibrium path.
The probability with which the demand p is accepted is at least as large
as the probability with which p0 is accepted.
Proof. Let q and q0 be the acceptance probabilities associated with
p and p0 respectively, and suppose to the contrary that q0 > q. In
particular, this means that q < 1. Let S (p) be the set of proposer
types who make the demand p with positive probability on the equi-
librium path. Since q < 1 there must be some type s 2 S (p) such
that ur (p;0;s) > ur (p;1;s). Since the responder's marginal utility of
rejection is increasing in p, this same inequality must be true for every
p00 > p. Then by Assumption 4, up (p;1;s) > up (p;0;s). This is a
contradiction since a proposer of type s could then strictly increase his
payo by demanding p0 which is accepted with higher probability. 
Proof of Theorem 6.
Theorem. Suppose negative interdependence, that Assumptions 1, 2,
3, 4 hold and that that up(1;0;s) > up(1;1;s). Then an ascending se-
quence of demands (1;:::;K) can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium demands if
(1) K = 1; and
(2) there exists a strictly descending sequence of K+1 types (s1;:::;sK;sK+1)
with s1 = s and sK+1 = s satisfying
Z sk
sk+1
fur (k;0;s)   ur (k;1;s)gdF(s)  0
with equality holding for all k except possibly for k = 1.
Proof. The proof involves constructing a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equi-
librium. Begin with the lowest demand 1. Since
Z s1
s2
fur (1;0;s)   ur (1;1;s)gdF(s)  0
this demand is acceptable to a responder who believes that the proposer
who makes it has a type in the interval [s2;s1]. Set q1 = 1 so that the
lowest demand is surely accepted. Proposers whose types are in the
interval [s2;s1] will make demand 1 and responders will accept this
oer with probability 1.
Now for each k > 1, select qk such that
(B.1)
qkup(k;1;sk)+(1 qk)up(k;0;sk) = qk 1up(k 1;1;sk)+(1 qk 1)up(k 1;0;sk)
30That is, qk is chosen such that a proposer of type sk is indierent
between demanding k and k 1.




fur (k 1;0;s)   ur (k 1;1;s)gdF(s)  0
and Z sk
sk+1
fur (k;0;s)   ur (k;1;s)gdF(s)  0
imply that a responder who believes that the oer comes from a pro-
poser of type sk must want to accept k 1 and reject k and every
higher demand. Then by Assumption 4,
up (k;1;sk) > up (k;0;sk) = up (k 1;0;sk)
So from Assumption 1, (B.1) has a positive solution. Let proposers
whose type is in the interval [sk+1;sk] make the demand k, and suppose
this is accepted with probability qk.
From this construction, a proposer whose type is sk is just indierent
between demanding k and k 1. By the single crossing Assumption 2,
proposers whose types are below sk strictly prefer the demand k to the
demand k 1. On the other hand, if a proposer whose type exceeds sk
strictly prefers to make the demand k instead of k 1, then a proposer
whose type is sk must also by Assumption 2. Applying this argument
at each value of k, it follows that the best equilibrium path oer for a
proposer whose type is in the interval (sk+1;sk] is the demand k.
To deal with o equilibrium oers, observe that the lowest oer 1
that is made on the equilibrium path leads responders to believe that
the proposer has a type in some interval [s2;s] such that
Z s
s2
fur(1;0;s)   ur(1;1;s)gdF(s)  0
If this inequality is strict, then the oer is accepted with probability
1. In that case, suppose that lower oers are treated the same way -
i.e., they lead to the same inference about the proposer's type, and are
accepted with probability 1. Since proposer's payo is strictly increas-
ing as the size of an accepted demand increases, it will not pay any
proposer to make a demand below 1.
On the other hand, let p0 be an o equilibrium demand that exceeds
1. Suppose that k is the highest equilibrium path oer that is less
than p0. By assumption, a responder who thinks that the proposer's
31type is sk+1 is willing to accept the oer k but wants to reject every












Then as along the equilibrium path, if responders believe the proposer's
type is in the interval [s0;s00] when p0 is oered, and accept the demand
with probability q0, then proposers will all nd higher payos with
equilibrium path oers. 
Proof of Theorem 7.
Theorem. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 6, the ascending se-
quence of demands f1;:::;Kg can be supported as equilibrium oers
in some Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which every demand is
accepted with positive probability only if Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem
6 hold.
Proof. Condition 1: Let K be the highest demand and suppose it is
accepted with probability qK. If K < 1, then the o equilibrium
demand 1 must be accepted with probability at least qK to prevent
the proposer with type s (who prefers every demand to be rejected)
from deviating. This requires that for every proposer type s in the
set of proposer types S (K) who make the oer K in equilibrium,
up (1;0;s) > up (1;1;s), else one of these proposer types would deviate.
Now from Condition 4, ur (K;1;s) > ur (K;0;s) for every s 2
S (K) (if equality holds for some s then a responder who believed
the proposer's type were s would reject any higher demand requiring
a proposer of that type to want the demand 1 to be accepted). As a
consequence, the proposal K, and also pn = 1, must be accepted for
sure. Since the payo to acceptance is increasing as the demand rises,
every type in S (K) will want to deviate which is inconsistent with
equilibrium.
Condition 2: Any array of K distinct oers made on the equilibrium
path partitions the interval [s;s] into K subsets through the inference
that the responder makes from price. No two distinct demands which
are accepted with positive probability can be accepted with the same
probability in equilibrium, because proposers prefer higher demands.
The single crossing condition can then be used as in the proof of The-
orem 6 to show that all the subsets in the partition are intervals. The
32requirement that all demands are accepted with positive probability
then gives Assumption 2. 
Proof of Theorem 8.
Theorem. Suppose that up (p;1;s) = p(s) for some strictly posi-
tive function  and that there is some proposer type s < s such that
u(0;0;s) < 0. Then the function qkpk is decreasing when up (p;0;s) is
positive and increasing otherwise.
Proof. From (B.1) in the proof of Theorem 6
qk+1pk+1(sk+1) + (1   qk+1)up (pk+1;0;sk+1) =
= qkpk(sk+1) + (1   qk)up (pk;0;sk+1)
Re-arranging and using Assumption 1 gives
fqk+1pk+1   qkpkg(sk+1) = (qk+1   qk)up (pk;0;sk+1)
By Theorem 6, qk+1  qk. The sign of qk+1pk+1   qkpk is then deter-
mined by the sign of u(pk;0;sk+1). 
Appendix C. The Maximally Dispersed Equilibrium
In spite of the partial pooling present in every equilibrium, the dis-
cussion in this Appendix focuses on one particular equilibrium which
is the most informative. The Maximally Dispersed Equilibrium is con-
structed by generating a particular sequence of demands, and the in-
tervals associated with them. Begin by setting m = pn = 1. Select an
interval [s;sm) with sm < s such that
Z sm
s
fur(m;0;s)   ur(m;1;s)gdF(s) = 0
if such an sm exists. If the expression above is non-positive for all sm,
then the equilibrium is complete and all proposer types demand pn = 1
(the whole pie) in the Maximally Dispersed Equilibrium.
Otherwise, assume a sequence f(m;sm);(m 1;sm 1);:::;(k+1;sk+1)g
has been constructed for m;m 1;:::;k+1, with k+1 > 0 and sk+1 < s.
Let k be dened to be
(C.1) k := maxfP 3 p < k+1 : ur(p;0;sk+1)   ur(p;1;sk+1) < 0g
This price exists because by Assumption 3, there is some oer that is
acceptable to the responder no matter what her beliefs. Now select sk
such that Z sk
sk+1
fur(k+1;0;s)   ur(k+1;1;s)gdF(s) = 0
33if such an sk exists. Otherwise set sk = s and stop the construction.
Repeat this procedure until sk = s. Then re-index the demands and
cutos such that m is the number of demands in the sequence.
The demands and cutos satisfy the Conditions of Theorem 6 by
construction. The construction itself illustrates that such a sequence
always exists. If responders want to reject the highest demand given
their prior beliefs, then this sequence has at least two demands. At each
step in the construction, the next highest demand is always chosen to
be the highest demand that is consistent with conditions (1) and (2).
Figure C.1 illustrates how these demands are constructed.
m p = 1
1 - m p
k p
1 - k p
1 s s =
1 p
k s s m s 1 - m s 1 2 + - = k m s s
Figure C.1. Construction of Demands in Equilibrium
To make any more progress characterizing the equilibrium, we need
to put a little more structure on the feasible oers. Specically
Assumption 12. For any feasible oer pk, let (pk) be the type for
the proposer such that
ur (pk;1;(pk)) = ur (pk;0;(pk))
34Then Z (pk)
(pk+2)
fur (pk+1;1;s)   ur (pk+1;0;s)gdF (s)  0
If the function (p) is monotonically decreasing, then it will always
be possible to construct a grid that satises this assumption. Let [s;sm]
be the interval described in the construction of the Maximally Dis-
persed equilibrium such that
Z sm
s
fur (1;0;s)   ur (1;1;s)gdF(s) = 0
Now choose any price pm 1 such that
ur (pm 1;0;sm)   ur (pm 1;1;sm) < 0
This price is the rst important element in the grid, since oers between




fur (pm 1;0;s)   ur (pm 1;1;s)gdF (s) > 0
So pick s0 > (pm 1) such that
Z s0
sm
fur (pm 1;0;s)   ur (pm 1;1;s)gdF (s) = 0
and select any price pm 1 < p : (p) = s0 as the next point in the
grid of feasible demands. Repeating this procedure for lower demand
generates a set of feasible demands satisfying Assumption 12. So this
Assumption imposes a restriction on the set of feasible demands, not
on the preferences or beliefs of the players.
Theorem 13. If the grid of feasible demands satises Assumption 12,
and the Assumptions of Theorem 6 hold, then the Maximally Dispersed





being made with positive probability on the equilibrium
path.
Proof. The proof simply involves showing that the sequential construc-
tion of demands in the denition of the Maximally Dispersed Equi-
librium must cover every price in the interval. First note that if the
demand 1 is acceptable to the proposer given his prior beliefs, then p
and p coincide. Then the theorem follows trivially since there aren't





Now consider the second highest demand m 1. This is the highest
feasible demand that is strictly acceptable to a responder who believes
35the proposer's type is sm. Since p is dened such that a responder who
believes the proposer's type is sm is just indierent between accepting
and rejecting, a responder with the same belief will strictly accept the
highest demand in the grid that is less than p.
So let k be a feasible demand, and suppose that for each of the
feasible demands above k there is an interval of types satisfying (2).
In particular, there is some type sk+1 such that proposer types above
sk+1 are assigned to demands above k, and if k+1 is the next highest
feasible demand, then
ur (k+1;1;sk+1) < ur (k+1;0;sk+1)
Then by Assumption 12
Z (k 1)
sk+1
fur (k;1;s)   ur (k;0;sk)gdF (s) < 0
Hence sk > (k 1), so that
ur (k 1;1;sk) > ur (k 1;0;sk)
This means that k 1 is the next demand used in construction of the
Maximally Dispersed equilibrium.
Since this construction continues until sk hits the boundary s, every
feasible demand above p will appear in this construction. 
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